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Abstract
This paper studies the impact of instrumental voting on information
demand and mass media behaviour during electoral campaigns. If vot-
ers act instrumentally then information demand should increase with the
closeness of an election. Mass media are modeled as profit-maximizing
firms that take into account information demand, the value of customers
to advertisers and the marginal cost of customers. Information supply
should be larger in electoral constituencies where the contest is expected
to be closer, there is a higher population density, and customers are on
average more profitable for advertisers. The impact of electorate size is
theoretically undetermined. These conclusions are then tested with com-
fortable results on data from the 1997 general election in Britain.
1 Introduction and related literature
The literature explaining voting and elections using the tools of rational choice
theory is vast. This approach to electoral behaviour assumes instrumental vot-
ing: citizens care about public policies and voting is the instrument to reach
them, or at least to increase the probability of obtaining the preferred option.
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This theory poses some problems, including the fact that the probability
to be pivotal in large elections is normally so low that it could be considered
negligible in optimization processes. This criticism can be overcome if we are
ready to compromise on what we intend by a rational act. In a weak sense,
agents behave rationally according to their perception of the reality, that could
be different from the “objective” state of facts. In the case of voting, the proba-
bility to be pivotal in a large election is clearly very low, but it is not zero. The
subjective perception of the probability of casting a decisive vote does not neces-
sarily coincide with the infinitesimal numbers that appropriate but cumbersome
calculations would deliver (see for example Uhlaner and Grofman 1986). More-
over, voting can be seen as a “low cost-low benefit” activity (Aldrich 1993): it
is therefore possible that even small changes in this probability might have an
effect on incentives to participate in an election.
If we accept this argument then turnout should be larger in closer elections,
when the probability to cast the decisive vote is higher. Unfortunately empirical
analysis does not deliver any firm conclusion. Foster (1984), after reviewing a
number of studies on the closeness-turnout linkage in the US, concludes that
“the perceived probability of a tied election at the state level is not a powerful or
reliable factor in explaining across-state voter participation rates in presidential
elections”. Grofman, Collet and Griffin (1998) study on US Senate and House
of Representatives elections find evidence of higher turnout among registered
voters in closer contests. Other recent studies based either on aggregate data
(Kunce 2001) or on survey data (Matsusaka and Palda 1999) show instead a
poor relationship between closeness and turnout. Using poll data, Kunce (2001)
also shows how “the extent to which pre-election perceptions matter depends
directly on how one measures the likelihood of a close contest”. It seems fair to
say that evidence is, at best, mixed.
In this paper we will consider another implication of instrumental voting:
when elections are closer then information on candidates and platforms should
be more valuable as the probability for a vote to matter is higher. Although
Downs (1957) himself hints at both the “paradox of voting” (low incentives to
vote) and “rational ignorance” (low incentives to gather political information) as
closely related consequences of instrumental voting, the second of the two para-
doxes has received less attention, in particular for what concerns the predictive
implications of comparative static analysis.
Thus, information acquisition should be related to the probability for a voter
to be pivotal. If the suppliers of political information (mass media) are aware of
this, then we should expect also their behaviour to be influenced by marginality.
In this sense, mass media behaviour under different circumstances will give us
the possibility to provide a different kind of test of theories of instrumental
voting and of the role of marginality as an incentive for participation. This
clearly allows us to exploit information not used so far for this purpose.
The second purpose of this paper has to do with the potential impact of
political information and mass media on public policy. Recent theoretical and
empirical research points clearly in this direction. Besley and Burgess (2002)
provide evidence on Indian states responsiveness to calamities and find that this
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is associated with the circulation of newspapers. Besley and Prat (2002) show
how mass media pluralism can increase information availability and politicians’
accountability. In general, as information plays a key role in agency relations, it
is reasonable to expect information availability to be important for accountabil-
ity (and therefore for public policy) when decision-making power is delegated
to governments (see also Lohmann 1998). The distribution of political infor-
mation may have an impact on redistributive policy as office-seeking politicians
will target their platforms at voters that are more likely to be aware of them
(Larcinese 2002a). Stromberg (2002) shows how candidates’ platforms can be
driven by mass media targeting of specific groups. Stromberg (2001) also shows
how the diffusion of radio had a significant impact on the distribution of New
Deal spending.
Indeed, most people seem to believe that mass media have a relevant impact
on citizens’ electoral choices. Politicians appear to struggle for media attention
and tend to complain when they do not receive enough space on newspapers
or television. Some politicians blame the media for bad electoral performances.
In some countries access to television and electoral advertising during electoral
campaigns are publicly regulated and even publicly funded. All this must be
based on the presumption that media are effective in influencing voters’ behav-
iour.
Studies in this sense have not delivered any conclusive evidence, both because
of an objective lack of data and because of the difficulty to identify the media
effects in reality. In particular, media effects could potentially be of several
different types. At the very minimum, the media can be seen as informing
the citizens about the different available options on the political market. Some
theories, however, give to mass media more power than this and see them as
capable of persuading the people by shaping their policy preferences. Research
in this direction started in the period between the two World Wars, under a
general presumption that mass communication was an extraordinarily powerful
device (see Lippman 1922). However, the first systematic study conducted on
survey data by a group of researchers at Columbia University seemed rather to
show the opposite (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1944). The influence of
the Columbia school (also through a subsequent work by Berelson, Lazarsfeld
and McPhee 1954) was such that since then the dominant view has been that
campaigning and the media have only “minimal effects” on voters. Until quite
recently, most studies continued to find little evidence of persuasion by mass
media (Finkel 1993).
A radical shift in communication studies has been induced by a new cogni-
tive theory that goes under the name of “uses and gratifications” (see Blumler
and McQuail 1968). Rather then asking what are the effects of the media on
people’s opinions, this theory starts by asking why the people use the media in
the first place. Only understanding individual motivations will make possible to
recognize the possible effects. It is immediate that this theory should be of par-
ticular interest to rational choice theorists as it basically starts from individual
preferences. The shift in the focus of attention produced new empirical evidence
that seemed in contrast with the minimal effects found by the Columbia school.
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Iyengar and Kinder (1987) examine evidence from electoral campaigns and tele-
vision news and conclude that their effects have not much to do with persua-
sion but rather with “commanding the public’s attention (agenda-setting) and
defining criteria underlying the public’s judgement (priming)”1. Bartels (1993)
shows how apparent “minimal effects” can be, at least partially, a consequence
of measurement errors. Zaller (1992 and 1995) puts forward one further argu-
ment against the “minimal effects” evidence by arguing that tangible effects are
only due to the “reception gap”, the difference between the amount of infor-
mation received about different candidates. According to Zaller, most studies
were conducted on presidential elections, where the campaign is normally quite
intense on both sides, with plenty of information on both candidates: this gen-
erates a minimal reception gap and therefore minimal effects, which is not the
same as saying that the campaigns had no effect. In local elections, where the
reception gap between incumbents and challengers is normally much larger, the
impact of the media appears instead sizeable.
What is missing so far is a formal analysis of the political information mar-
ket, with a demand for information that comes from individual preferences and
a supply of information provided, among others, by media firms. This type of
analysis would clearly be more limited in scope, not pretending to identify the
broad range of possible media effects. However, by restricting our attention on
few observable variables, we can be more precise on media’s behaviour during
electoral campaigns and on voters’ motivation. This can clearly have conse-
quences for our presumptions on the possible effects of mass media on voters.
Among previous studies in this direction, Matsusaka (1995) provides a Bayesian
decision-theoretical model of political information demand. Larcinese (2002b)
models information acquisition as an individual production function, consider-
ing the role of ideological beliefs, and provides evidence on the linkage between
information and turnout during the 1997 general election in Britain. Specific
characteristics of the media industry (like economies of scale and concentration)
can also be expected to matter for the way people are informed about politics.
Works in this direction are Spence and Owen (1977) and Noam (1987).
The theoretical model presented in this paper builds on Stromberg’s (2002)
model of mass media competition. Stromberg argues that “the increasing-
return-to-scale technology and advertising financing of media firms induce them
to provide more news to large groups, such as tax payers and dispersed consumer
interests, and groups that are valuable to advertisers”. Eventually, this infor-
mation bias will be taken into account by politicians when proposing electoral
platforms and will therefore translate into a policy bias.
We will explicitly model information acquisition and how it relates with the
election closeness as well as with observable individual characteristics. Our units
of analysis (called “groups” in Stromberg’s model) are represented by electoral
constituencies: in this way we will be able to implement a test of our predictions,
as well as of some of Stromberg’s results.
1Bartels (1988), Zaller (1989), Popkin (1991), and Franklin (1991) find similar results. The
theory of agenda-setting was first proposed by McCombs and Shaw (1972).
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One of such results concerns the effect of group size on news supply. Larger
groups should receive more media attention as they provide more readership
and therefore more revenue. The same can be said of groups that are more
valuable to advertisers (for example wealthier groups). However, in the context
of our model a countervailing effect can be identified: in larger groups we should
expect a more severe collective action problem. Thus, in larger constituencies
the probability to cast a decisive vote is smaller and such will be the demand
for information. This “collective action effect” can potentially offset the “group
size effect”; only empirical investigation can shed further light and allow us to
accept or reject any theoretical result in this sense.
Information supply also depends on the newspapers’ production function.
Fixed costs are normally very high but we argue that delivery costs could also
play an important role in information supply: more densely populated areas
will receive more news coverage (other things equal) simply because the cost of
the marginal reader is lower in such areas.
The paper can be summarized as follows. In the next section we will present
the theoretical model of information demand and supply. Political information
can be demanded for a number of reasons, including instrumental voting. Thus,
it will be higher in marginal constituencies. This higher demand will induce
a larger supply by profit-maximizing media firms. Media’s revenue per reader
is represented by the price paid for the newspaper plus the amount paid by
advertisers per reader. This amount is not the same for all customers and can
be expected to be higher for customers that are more valuable to advertisers.
The cost of producing newspapers is fixed but there is a variable delivery cost.
Thus, in equilibrium, information supply is higher in marginal constituencies as
well as in constituencies with richer and more concentrated electorate. About
the size of the electorate we identify two effects working in opposite directions,
the “group size effect” and the “collective action effect”. In section 3 these
predictions are tested using data from the 1997 general election in the United
Kingdom. The test consists of two parts. The first uses aggregate data and
focuses on mass media behaviour. We will use data collected from a major
national newspaper during the electoral campaign, as well as electoral data and
the 1991 Census. The second part will focus instead on individual behaviour
and use survey data from the 1997 British General Election Study. The results
suggest a high degree of compatibility between our theory and the data. Section
4 concludes.
2 The model
We start by considering a polity divided into two electoral constituencies µ
and o. Each constituency elects a member of parliament (MP). There are two
competing parties L and R each presenting one candidate in all constituencies.
MPs are elected in a first past the post system. With obvious notation we will
indicate the candidates in each constituency with Lµ, Rµ, Lo, Ro.
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Suppose the two candidates in each constituency are chosen independently
by parties through a process that is unknown to citizens. This process can
be represented for both parties by respective distribution functions FR(a) and
FL(a) (with densities fL(a) and fR(a)) over the support A ⊆ ?+ of candidates’
types.
For simplicity we will assume that the policy space is the same as the candi-
dates’ space and, abusing notation, that utility from policy a is a. Policies are
formed at the central level by the parliament of the two MPs and affect both
constituencies. If aµ is the candidate elected in constituency µ and ao is elected
in constituency o, then the central policy will be a∗ = 12aµ +
1
2ao.
The net benefit to citizen in constituency µ from electing the preferred of
the two candidates aµL and aµR is given by
B(aµL, aµR|ao) = |(1
2
ao +
1
2
aµL)− (
1
2
ao +
1
2
aµR)|
=
1
2
|aµL − aµR|. (1)
Analogously
B(aoL, aoR|aµ) = 1
2
|aoL − aoR|. (2)
We also assume that µ is marginal and this is common knowledge; i.e.,
if we indicate with Pi (i = µ, o) the (common) prior probability that a vote
will result decisive, each agent believes that Pµ > Po. We can think of these
probabilities as coming from different prior beliefs about the candidates in the
two constituencies. For example in constituency µ the distribution functions
FR(a) and FL(a) are “more similar” than in o. However, also the population
size in each constituency will clearly play a role as a larger electorate, with
given priors, will reduce the probability of each single vote to be pivotal. This
“collective action effect” can be expected to play a role and will be considered
in the empirical investigation. A trivial way to consider this effect is to write
Pi = Pi(Ni) where Ni is the size (in terms of electorate) of constituency i.
2.1 Information demand
To avoid cumbersome notation we will focus on a generic constituency. Citizens
utility from voting when types are known is then W (aL, aR) = PB(aL, aR).
However, the expected utility from an informed voting choice before candidates
are selected is given by
W ∗ = P
] ]
B(aL, aR)dFL(a)dFR(a) (3)
For simplicity, and without loss of generality, here we will assume that there is
no cost of voting.
We assume voters are ex ante uninformed about candidates. We will indicate
the expected utility from uninformed voting as iW. We can then define the ex
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post utility of an informed versus an uninformed vote as
∆(aL, aR) =W (aL, aR)−iW (4)
Before gathering information, however, the candidate types are unknown.
Thus, the ex ante utility of gathering information is
∆ =
] ]
[W (aL, aR)−iW ]dFL(a)dFR(a). (5)
Lemma 1 ∆ =W ∗ −iW ≥ 0.
Proof.
Let us consider a generic constituency and introduce the following notation:
A2L =

aL, aR s.t. P
] ]
(aL − aR)dFL(a)dFR(a) > 0

A2R =

aL, aR s.t. P
] ]
(aL − aR)dFL(a)dFR(a) < 0

Suppose now that FL(a) and FR(a) are s.t. candidate L is preferred, i.e.
] ]
(aL − aR)dFL(a)dFR(a) > 0
An uninformed voter in this case votes for candidate L. Her ex ante utility is
iW = 1
2
Pi
] ]
A2L
(aL − aR)dFL(a)dFR(a)−
1
2
Pi
] ]
A2R
(aR − aL)dFL(a)dFR(a)
The ex ante (i.e. before knowing the realization of candidates) utility of an
informed vote is instead
W ∗ =
1
2
Pi
] ]
A2L
(aL − aR)dFL(a)dFR(a) +
Pi
] ]
A2R
(aR − aL)dFL(a)dFR(a).
The second term in the right-hand side is positive by definition, therefore
W ∗ −iW ≥ 0.?
Political information can be demanded for a number of different purposes.
Instrumental voting is just one possibility. A sense of civic duty for exam-
ple might play a role as this can be seen as part of being a “good citizen”.
Political information can also be demanded to understand or forecast public
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policies and this in turn can be useful for better private decision-making (see
Larcinese 2002a). Finally, information can be enjoyed as a consumption good
and therefore be directly included in the utility function. We represent all this
“exogenous” utility from information with Λ and say that total utility from
information is
Φ = Λ+ λ∆ (6)
Instrumental voting therefore implies that λ > 0. Otherwise we should expect
λ = 0, i.e. no demand for political information arising from voting decision-
making. Thanks to the following result, we will be able to test λ > 0 versus an
alternative of λ = 0.
Proposition 1 If λ > 0 then Φ is higher in constituency µ.
Proof. Straightforward from the (1), as ∆ = ∆(P ) with ∂∆(P )∂P > 0 and P is
inversely related to expected margins of victory.
2.2 Information supply and mass media
We consider two newspapers Γ and Θ. They supply political news about both
constituencies. We assume they have a fixed space s to devote to these news
and indicate with sΓµ ∈ [0, s ] the space devoted by newspaper Γ to news about
µ; analogously we can define sΓo , s
Θ
µ , s
Θ
o . Each citizen buys one newspaper. The
probability for a citizen that buys newspaper j to get informed about con-
stituency i is q(sji ), with q
3 ≥ 0 and q33 ≤ 0. We will assume each citizen only
cares about her own constituency, thus simply ignoring news about the other
constituency.
We then have sjµ + s
j
o = s (j = Γ,Θ) and define a newspaper news profile
as

sjµ, s
j
o

. A citizen living in constituency µ gets from newspaper Γ a utility
from news equal to
Ψ(sΓµ) = q(sΓµ)Φµ. (7)
Newspapers also report about other things apart from politics. Culture,
sport, and other events are also covered as well as enjoyed by readers. Each
paper has its own mix over these different forms of entertainment and also its
own way of dealing with them. Also, the way politics in itself can be reported is
not unique. The depth and the focus of news, as well as possible partizanship,
all matter for the reader. We will therefore indicate the expected utility from
newspaper Γ (Θ) to citizen k in constituency µ with Ψ(sΓµ) + γk (Ψ(sΘµ ) +
θk), where γk (θk) is a fixed characteristic of newspaper Γ (Θ) that makes
it different from Θ (Γ). Analogously for the other constituency. We are then
assuming that editorial choices, entertainment content, partizanship etc. are
fixed characteristics of each newspaper: this is not an unrealistic assumption in
the short run and certainly within the space of an electoral campaign.
Then we say that citizen k in constituency µ buys newspaper Γ if
Ψ(sΓµ) + γk ≥ Ψ(sΘµ ) + θk (8)
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and buys newspaper Θ otherwise. Let us indicate with eΨµ the difference
Ψ(sΓµ)−Ψ(sΘµ ) and with ηk the difference θk− γk.
Newspapers are uncertain about individual preferences, in particular pref-
erences about the entertainment component. We assume ηk is distributed ac-
cording to a distribution function Hi (i = µ, o), which is common knowledge.
The corresponding density function is hi. Thus, the probability that citizen k
in constituency µ buys newspaper Γ is given by Pr[ηk ≤ eΨµ] = Hi(eΨµ).
We then introduce the following assumption, that will ensure that the pay-off
functions of the newspapers are concave2.
Assumption 1 |h
3
i(
eΨi)|
hi(eΨi)
≤ |q
33
i (s
j
i )|
Φ[iq3i(s
j
i )]
2
, i = µ, o; j = Γ,Θ.
Newspapers maximize expected profits. Each reader provides the newspaper
with a revenue ρ which is the sum of the price directly paid by readers to buy the
paper and the amount paid by advertisers per reader. Therefore total profits in
the industry are given by Π = nρ− 2C, where n is the total number of citizens
in the polity and C the fixed cost to produce each newspaper. For the moment,
we only consider fixed costs and assume marginal costs are zero. In reality there
are variable costs due to printing and delivery but the “cost of the first copy”
is normally the biggest by far. We will consider variable costs later.
Since we are interested in the share of the market that newspapers have in
each constituency we will rewrite the expected profit equation for newspaper Γ
as
E(ΠΓ) = ρ[E(nΓµ) +E(nΓo )]−C (9)
where nji is the number of readers newspaper j has in constituency i. For
newspaper Θ we have ΠΘ = Π−ΠΓ. Since costs are sunk, newspapers are only
interested in maximizing revenue: in our model this implies that newspapers
will maximize the expected number of readers. Indicating with Ni the total
number of voters in constituency i, we will have
E(nΓ) = NµHµ(eΨµ) +NoHo(eΨo) (10)
E(nΘ) = Nµ[1−Hµ(eΨµ)] +No[1−Ho(eΨo)] (11)
A strategy for newspaper j is given by sj = [sjµ, s
j
o]. We will indicate the set of
feasible strategies for newspaper j with Σj = {sjµ, sjo| sjµ + sjo = s}.
This is a zero-sum game. Therefore a Nash equilibrium of the maximizing
readership game is given by a strategy profile {s∗Γ, s∗Θ} s.t. s∗Γ ∈ ΣΓ, s∗Θ ∈ ΣΘ
and
E(nΓ|s∗Γ, sΘ) ≥ E(nΓ|s∗Γ, s∗Θ) ≥ E(nΓ|sΓ, s∗Θ) (12)
Proposition 2 Suppose that Assumption 1 is satisfied, λ > 0, and Nµ = No.
Then an equilibrium strategy profile {s∗Γ, s∗Θ} must satisfy sΓµ = sΘµ > sΓo =
sΘo .
2This is an adaptation of condition C1 in Lindbeck and Weibull (1987). Interpretations of
this condition in the context of probabilistic voting are also discussed in their paper.
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Proof. The best response function for newspaper j is defined implicitly by
the first order conditions
Nµhµ(eΨµ)Φµq
3
(sjµ) = ϕ
Noho(eΨo)Φoq
3
(sjo) = ϕ
j = Γ,Θ
where ϕ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the problem. This implies
q
3
(sΓµ) = q
3
(sΘµ )
q
3
(sΓo ) = q
3
(sΘo )
and therefore
sΓµ = s
Θ
µ
sΓo = s
Θ
o
Now remember that
Φµ = Λ+ λ∆(Pµ)
Φo = Λ+ λ∆(Po)
∂∆(Pi)
∂Pi
≥ 0, i = µ, o.
Being Φµ > Φo from the first order conditions we get that sjµ > sjo, j = Γ,Θ.
To satisfy the second order conditions we need the Hessian matrix


Nµh
3
µ(eΨµ)[Φµq
3
(sjµ)]
2+
+Nµhµ(eΨµ)Φµq
33
(sjµ)
0
0
Noh
3
o(eΨo)[Φoq
3
(sjo)]
2+
+Noho(eΨo)Φoq
33
(sjo)


to be negative semi-definite. A sufficient condition is, in this case, that each ele-
ment on the main diagonal is non-positive. Assumption 1, therefore, guarantees
that the second order conditions are satisfied.?
So far we only focused on the implications of marginality on information
demand and supply. There are a number of other factors that can have an
influence on information demand and supply and therefore should be used as
control variables when trying to assess the effects of election closeness. On the
media revenue side it is quite realistic to assume that not everyone has the same
value for advertisers and that newspapers are capable of discriminating among
different readers. The extent of this discrimination depends on the knowledge
newspapers and advertisers have of market conditions and people’s character-
istics. Thus, we should expect this type of discrimination to become more and
more relevant as new technologies improve the amount and quality of infor-
mation on customers. Stromberg (2002) relates the value to advertisers to an
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interest in specific aspects of public policy: for example, being interested in a
particular public service rather than others reveals something about people’s
income, and readers’ income is important for advertisers. At the same time
in practice we do not observe any price discrimination across different readers.
This means that discrimination will mainly occur through information supply.
Another consideration concerns costs. So far we assumed that the marginal
cost of producing and delivering papers was zero. Although, as we said, mar-
ginal costs have only a minor part in the production of newspapers, for our
purposes delivery costs could be important. We are considering possible spa-
tial discrimination by newspapers and in this sense delivery costs could show
substantial variation. In particular, in areas which are densely populated, mar-
ginal delivery costs are quite low while they could be sizeable if our newspapers
wanted to reach readers in remote parts of the country.
By modifying our assumptions and introducing differentiated constituencies
we will therefore obtain a rationale for control variables that will make our test
more reliable. At the same time in this way we will also be able to implement
a direct test of some of the main Stromberg’s results.
Heterogeneity here enters at the constituency level. In other terms news-
papers are not able to discriminate readers according to any other individual
characteristics apart from the constituency they come from, and we now assume
constituencies are statistically different. This is actually the strategy that will
be used to implement the empirical analysis.
Assumption 2 ρµ 9= ρo.
Advertisers will induce from the constituency a number of other character-
istics of interest and therefore will be willing to pay differently for marginal
readers coming from different constituencies.
Assumption 3 introduces delivery costs.
Assumption 3 The newspaper cost function is TC = C + NµHµ(eΨµ)υµ +
NoHo(eΨo)υo, where υµ and υo are the cost of marginal readers.
For empirical purposes we will mainly identify υµ and υo with delivery costs.
Now we can define the net marginal revenue per-reader as
hρi = ρi − υi, i = µ, o (13)
The profit equation for newspaper j can be re-written as
E(Πj) = hρµE(njµ) + hρoE(njo)−C, j = Γ,Θ (14)
To ensure that every citizen buys one newspaper and newspapers have an
interest in reaching all citizens we assume the following:
Assumption 4 hρi > 0 ∀i.
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Now the problem will not simply be to maximize expected readership, as each
reader must be weighted by her “net value”. The next proposition provides the
Nash equilibrium condition in this case.
Proposition 3 Suppose Assumptions 1-4 are satisfied and λ > 0. Then an
equilibrium strategy profile {s∗Γ, s∗Θ} must satisfy sΓµ = sΘµ , sΓo = sΘo and
q
3
(s∗µ)
q3 (s∗o)
= NohρoΦoNµhρµΦµ .
Proof. The profit equation for newspaper j can be expressed as
E(Πj) = hρµNµHµ(eΨµ) + hρoNoHo(eΨo)−C, j = Γ,Θ.
The result follows immediately from the first order conditions
hρµNµhµ(eΨµ)Φµq
3
(sjµ) = ϕ
hρoNoho(eΨo)Φoq
3
(sjo) = ϕ
j = Γ,Θ.
where ϕ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the maximization prob-
lem.
Proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 2, it is straightforward to show
that Assumption 1 is sufficient for the second order conditions to be satisfied.?
Proposition 3 tells us that now newspapers can discriminate across con-
stituencies also on the basis of further information they may have. Other
things equal, information supply will be higher in the constituency with larger
hρi(·) = ρi(·) − υi(·). On the revenue side we can relate the readers’ value for
advertisers to factors as income, age, education etc. The net value of readers
for newspapers will then take into account their location and be higher where
readers are on average more valuable and lower where delivery costs are higher;
we will use population density to capture this last element.
Finally, also the total size of constituencies, Nµ and No , (in terms of absolute
population, or absolute electorate) should play a role. However, as we noticed
at the start of this section, we can have both a “groups size effect” (like in
Stromberg) as well as a “collective action effect” and we will approach empirical
investigation with no prior about the sign of this variable.
We can therefore summarize our findings in the following testable proposi-
tion:
Theoretical Results Other things equal, information supply is higher in con-
stituencies with a closer electoral race, more densely populated, and where
citizens are on average more valuable to advertisers. The effect of the size
of electorate is uncertain.
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3 Evidence
We will proceed now to verify the compatibility of our theoretical results with
data. Empirical investigation will concern the 1997 general election in the
United Kingdom. For the purpose of this analysis we will use data from England,
Scotland and Wales. The political situation in Northern Ireland is substantially
different from the rest of the country as the main divide is between Catholic
and Protestants rather than on the traditional left-right dimension.
In the U.K. members of parliament (MPs) are elected one in each con-
stituency in a first past the post system. The election is won by the party
which obtains the larger number of MPs as support of the parliament is nec-
essary to become prime minister. Party leaders are intended to be candidate
prime minister, but they still need to win in their own constituency to become
MP. There are two major parties, Conservative and Labour, although other par-
ties manage to win in some constituencies. In particular the Liberal-democratic
party is well established nationally as a “third party”. In the 1997 the Labour
party obtained a neat victory after 18 years of Conservative ruling.
3.1 The Data
Evidence provided is of two types. First, we will focus on information supply,
using the electoral constituency as unit of observation. There were 641 such
constituencies in England, Scotland, and Wales in 1997.
Three main sources of data will be used. First of all we need data about
information supply by newspapers. For this purpose we will use a major na-
tional newspaper, “The Guardian”. We will define information supply for each
constituency as the number of articles that mention such constituency or one of
its candidates during the last 30 days of the electoral campaign. This variable
is indicated as News.
We will then use information about electoral results3. In particular, we
will use this information to measure the marginality of a constituency. A first
possibility is to focus on percentage differences and therefore use the following
formula:
W −R
W +R
(15)
where W is the percentage of votes for the winning candidate and R the per-
centage for the runner up. The larger such indicator the lower the degree of
marginality of the constituency. However, to capture the idea of marginality
as the probability of casting a decisive vote, the absolute difference in votes
between candidates might be a more appropriate indicator. We will consider
both possibilities.
One problem with such indicators is that they measure election closeness ex
post. A rational expectations assumption would work in favour of using such
measures: in general, when using aggregate data, there is no reason to expect
3Boothroyd (2002).
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a systematic bias in expectations within a constituency. Nevertheless, voters’
swings are not always well predicted by opinion polls, and this could generate
non-random biases in voters’ expectations4.
One alternative possibility is to use past election results. Unfortunately
this would also be quite problematic in our case. The main obstacle is that in
between 1992 (year of the previous general election) and 1997 most constituency
borders were changed, making therefore hard any comparison, even where the
denominations were left unchanged. Moreover, in 1997 there were expectations
of a large swing from the ruling party (Conservatives) to opposition parties
(mainly the Labour): thus, previous election closeness could not represent a
good measure of expected election closeness as this would crucially depend on
who held the constituency.
For these reasons, to capture expected closeness we will use the BBC “100
contested constituencies”. Those are constituencies on which the BBC decided
to focus its attention on the night of the results: they were the expected closest
100 Conservative-held constituencies (and therefore the decisive ones). This
should capture information from polls and the general feeling about election
closeness of BBC journalists.
We will also use information about the total number of electors in each
constituency and the turnout percentage. With the first variable we try to test
if the “group size effect” can actually prevail on the “collective action effect”.
The percentage of turnout indicates the extent of political participation (at least
in the form of voting) and therefore can be broadly intended as a measure of
interest in politics by the citizens of a given area.
Information about other possibly relevant characteristics of the constituency
will be derived from the 1991 Census5. We include the population density, one
of the key variables in our theoretical analysis, entering into the newspapers’
cost function. Then we consider variables that can possibly give a representation
of the social and economic conditions of the districts. Information on income
is not available but proxies have been used, namely the unemployment rate
and the percentage of citizenship with high qualifications (degree and higher).
Age can have an influence on propensity to consume and consumption patterns
(thus affecting how valuable a reader is to advertisers) and therefore has been
included. Also, the percentage of inactive population (mainly retired, but also
including students and permanently sick) is used. There are reasons (as well as
anecdotic evidence6) to think that inactive population, in particular old or sick
individuals, should be less valuable to advertisers, as they tend to consume less
than average, or are less responsive to advertising.
4 See Cox (1988) or Kunce (2001) for some problematic aspects of ex post indicators.
5The data we used were recorded at the level of districts, local administration entities
with no direct link with electoral constituencies. Most constituencies are contained within
the borders of a single district and these posed no problems. Others (around 25% of them)
span over parts of different districts and in such cases data referred to districts have been
weighted in order to get approximated constituency data. The weighting factors have been
reconstructed by using the detailed description of constituencies (and their relations with
districts and wards) contained in Rallings and Thrasher (1995).
6 See Stromberg (2002).
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One possible concern might derive from the fact that The Guardian, like most
national newspapers in the U.K., is based in London. This could bias the news in
favour of London constituencies both because of a lower cost of news collection
and, more generally, because of a larger sensitivity to a nearer environment.
This could be particularly relevant for our results about population density,
given that this variable is clearly higher in London than elsewhere. For this
reason we include a Greater London control dummy, equal to 1 for the Greater
London constituencies.
Finally we also include a “big-shot” control. As some candidates have nat-
urally a prominent position and bigger visibility during the electoral campaign,
it seems necessary to be able to single out this effect from what we want to
test. Therefore we introduce a dummy variable equal to 1 for constituencies
where “big-shots” are candidates. By big-shot we intend all the candidates who
have been ministers in the current and any past government, the members of
the current “shadow-cabinet”, and the current leader of the Liberal Democratic
Party.
We also provide evidence on citizens’ use of newspapers across different con-
stituencies. This helps us isolating the hypothesis that differentiated supply is
actually a consequence of differentiated demand from the competing possibility
that all citizens are interested in marginal constituencies. For this purpose we
will use the 1997 British General Election Study, a post-election survey con-
sisting of individual observations about people that were interviewed a short
time after the election. Our sample will consists of 2807 observations. Among
other questions, respondents were asked whether and how frequently they used
to read newspapers during the electoral campaign, and which paper. In the
U.K. the distinction between high quality and low quality (tabloid) papers is
quite straightforward and commonly accepted. We can therefore separate regu-
lar users of quality papers during the electoral campaign (QP ) from the rest of
the population and try to assess the impact of marginality on the demand for
political information. We also have information on the usage of local papers and
this can be exploited to make our conclusions more robust. Data include a num-
ber of demographic and economic characteristics of the interviewed individuals,
as well as a measure of ideological motivation.
All variables are described in more detail in the Appendix and summary
statistics are reported in table 1.
3.2 Empirical Specification
Using the dataset described above we intend to test the theoretical results re-
ported at the end of section 2. Preliminary data analysis seems to suggest that
a very limited number of constituencies get a disproportionate attention from
media (see Tab. 2). For example almost 90% of constituencies have News ≤ 5
while only 3 constituencies have News > 100. This suggests that the relation-
ship we want to estimate could be highly non-linear.
15
A linear regression would indeed deliver quite poor results. We will instead
present estimates for the following equation:
ln(Newsi) = α0 + α1Di + α
3
2Xi + α
3
3Zi + ui, i = 1, ..., 641 (16)
where:
D is a measure of the distance between candidates (winner and runner
up) or a dummy for expected contested constituencies (bbc100), X is a three-
dimensional vector of population density, size of the electorate, and turnout
(therefore α32 = [α21,α22,α23]), and Z represents a set of control variables from
the 1991 Census, plus the “big-shot” dummy (α33 = [α31,α32, ...α3k]). As usual
ui represents independent disturbance terms that have zero mean and are un-
correlated with the exogenous variables of the model. Estimation will be by
OLS.
Almost all the parameters have an expected sign in terms of our model.
However, our main parameter of interest is α1. In general, we want to assess if
α1 is significantly different from zero. As discussed previously, we will consider
several possible measures of constituencies’ marginality, and we expect a neg-
ative sign for measures of the distance between candidates and a positive sign
for bbc100.
The other variables serve as controls with respect to this aim; at the same
time they are of interest for their own sake as we can use their estimates to
assess the reliability of our model of the information market.
It is important to distinguish alternative competing possibilities from our
hypothesis that larger news supply is a consequence of higher demand. We will
accomplish this task by estimating newspaper readership at the individual level.
The equation to be estimated in this case is given by
QPi = β0 + β1Di + β
3
2Wi + ui, i = 1, ..., 2807 (17)
where QP is a binary variable equal to 1 for a quality paper or a local paper
reader, andW is a vector of individual control variables including, among other
covariates, income, education, sex and age.
3.3 Results
OLS estimates of equation (16) are reported in Table 3. We start by considering
the role of election closeness. In column 1 and 2 we use ex post indicators of
election closeness (based on percentage distance in column 1 and absolute dis-
tance in column 2). In both cases ex post distance has the expected sign and is
significant at 5% level in column 1 and very close to it in column 2. When we
use expected closeness (as captured by the dummy bbc100 in column 3) the sig-
nificance level increases substantially, reaching a nil p-value for the hypothesis
of α1 being zero. As discussed previously, the 1997 general election witnessed
a large generalized shift of votes away from the Conservative party. This was
to some extent expected and therefore the most interesting constituencies were
the previously Conservative-held ones. In a sense, the final outcome was mainly
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decided in such constituencies and this should have increased the demand for
information7. Thus, it is not surprising that when we focus on contested Con-
servative constituencies results get sharper. Actually, some constituencies may
have been ex post very close just because the swing of votes has probably been
larger than expected, making the Labour candidates winning (marginally) also
in constituencies that never were marginal or Labour-held before. Therefore, ex
post marginality could be an imperfect measure of expected salience.
In column 4 we also get rid of another ex post indicator, turnout, but results
remain substantially unchanged. Thus, from this analysis we can safely conclude
that expected marginality matters for information supply.
Other variables also show a high compatibility of our model with facts.
Population density has the expected sign and is always significant at the 5%
level, except in column 3, where it is significant at the 7.5% level.
The signs of other control variables also show good support for some of
the Stromberg-type conclusions. In particular, and differently from Stromberg,
we saw that the effect of group’s magnitude is not necessarily uncontroversial.
However, empirical evidence seems to suggest that the effect of the group size
should overcome the potential collective action problem that size generates. In
particular, in column 2 we use the absolute distance between candidates and
therefore we isolate the potential “group size effect”. However, there are no
noticeable differences between this and the other cases. Although the magnitude
and significance of the electorate size are larger in column 2, these remain always
positive and comfortably significant at the 5% or 1% level.
The same is not true for Turnout, that also should serve as a signal to
newspapers about the degree of attention to political matters. The sign is
always negative, although t-ratios are never satisfactory.
Good support also comes from the unemployment rate, that we use as a
proxy for the level of well-being in a given constituency. On the other hand
there is little evidence in favour of the relevance of other factors that the lit-
erature seems to have identified as determining information supply. Anecdotic
evidence is reported of television programmes that have been suspended because
watched mainly by the elderly, who where judged not valuable by advertisers.
We find that constituencies with larger inactive population (mainly represented
by retired) receive more attention from newspapers. It is clear that inactive
people might have more time to devote to information gathering and when we
come to election times retired people might also have all the incentives to put
a disproportionate attention to political platforms.
Finally, average age and the percentage of people with high degrees do not
seem to have significant effects, while there is some evidence of a “Greater
London effect”. A pure control variable is big-shot. Both the magnitude and
the significance of big-shot are relevant but this does not come as a surprise nor
is the consequence of any theoretical advance made in this paper.
7 In terms of our model, in general elections citizens care mainly about final policies: thus,
marginality in one constituency is more relevant when it matters for the whole outcome of the
election.
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In table 4 we turn to micro-level analysis and report probit estimates of equa-
tion (17). Most parameters show the expected sign, with education and income
being overall the best explanatory variables. Sex, church attendance and length
of residence in the area also show sizeable and significant effects. Our main vari-
able of interests, however, are the measures of electorate size and marginality.
While for the significance of most other variables several explanations are possi-
ble, the size of electorate and marginality have a strong relationship with voters’
instrumental behaviour. Both come with the expected sign, quite independently
of the marginality index used and the significance levels are rather reassuring.
We can see this as further evidence that mass media behaviour during that
electoral campaign was actually driven, at least partially, by instrumental de-
mand for information rather than a broad and non-instrumental interest in the
election.
4 Summary and conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to study the implications of instrumental
voting behaviour for the political information market. This allows us to test
the instrumental voting hypothesis by using data that have not been exploited
so far for this purpose, namely data on information acquisition and mass media
behaviour during electoral campaigns.
One central implication of instrumental voting is the positive linkage between
election closeness and political participation. Both theoretical and empirical lit-
erature have mainly identified participation with electoral turnout. We focus
instead on information acquisition and make more precise the idea that it should
be higher when elections are expected to be closer. On the other side of the in-
formation market, profit maximizing mass media should therefore discriminate
between different electoral constituencies according to their expected marginal-
ity. We do not observe newspapers’ price discrimination in reality. However
our research shows, both theoretically and empirically, that the media can have
a different way to discriminate, namely targeting their attention (in terms of
reported news) to marginal constituencies.
Moreover, research in communication studies and recent formal models, in
particular Stromberg (2002), have pointed out that the media can be expected
to target customers who are more valuable to advertisers, i.e. wealthier, better
educated, younger. Our model gives an explicit empirical content to those pre-
dictions and, by using the electoral constituencies in the 1997 British election
as units of observation, we can perform a formal empirical test of these con-
clusions. Evidence on Stromberg’s results is overall satisfactory: although not
all our estimates are compatible with such results, we can safely conclude that
there is enough evidence of newspapers targeting their news according to the
electorate characteristics. We also provide empirical support for the idea that
larger groups should receive more attention from the media, although we have
shown that this conclusion does not necessarily follow from the theory.
Information supply can also be linked with the newspapers’ cost function.
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We do not enter into the details of fixed costs, that represent a large part of
the cost of producing a newspaper. However, we find that delivery costs could
be relevant for the purpose of our analysis: in particular, information supply
should be higher in more densely populated areas. This proposition too finds
confirmation in our empirical investigation.
Our main purpose, however, was to show that information acquisition and
news supply is, at least partially, driven by instrumental voting. We show that
mass media, other things equal, tend to target marginal constituencies during
electoral campaigns. This could be due to a genuine higher information demand
arising in marginal constituencies as well as to a number of other reasons, like
a general interest of the public in marginal constituencies, or the effort of party
leaders to target marginal constituencies. To discriminate between these hy-
potheses we also provide evidence on voters’ usage of newspapers and find that
quality and local papers tend to be more demanded in marginal constituen-
cies. Thus, our analysis seems to suggest a comfortable compatibility between
instrumental voting behaviour and observed facts in the information market.
If we think that the media introduce a bias in the way people are informed
about politics, something that has been left aside in the present work, and if
this bias is in turn exploited by politicians, then we can speak of a “media-
driven-bias” in public policy-making. In the context of our model this bias is
combined with an “attention-bias” that should substantially drive politicians to
target marginal constituencies.
This analysis does not pretend to be conclusive and there are several margins
for improvements and questions that further research should try to address.
On the theoretical side, the model of media competition is still quite simple.
New insights could come from explicitly considering the advertising market and
the possibility for newspapers to select the combination of political information,
advertising and other news in the paper. Also, considering the possibility of
entry and, more in general, different industry structures, could deliver interest-
ing results as well as normative implications for regulating the media market8.
Further research could help us understanding redistributive implications. In
particular, and depending on the rules that regulate the relationship between
central governments and local administration, we should expect marginal con-
stituencies to benefit disproportionately of targetable benefits. This possibility
deserves closer scrutiny in future research.
On the empirical side, improvements on our current knowledge are also pos-
sible. For what concerns our estimates, the relationship between news and
closeness (as well as news and other variables) is clearly non-linear. We have
chosen a log-linear specification and shown that it fits our data quite well. It
would clearly be useful however to resort to non-parametric estimation. Above
all there is the need for further data collection about both individuals and the
media. More data about different newspapers (or other media), different elec-
tions and, possibly, different countries, could help us understand what is the
8An analysis of this type with respect to politicians’ accountability can be found in Besley
and Prat (2002).
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robustness and the generality of our results and maybe to isolate the relevant
institutional characteristics that induce differentiated behaviour.
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5 Appendix: description of variables and tables
5.0.1 Constituency level
• News. It is the number of articles appeared on the newspaper “The
Guardian” during the last 30 days before the poll date and containing
either a reference to the electoral constituency or the name of one of its
candidates.
• Dist_P = percentage distance between the winning candidate and the
runner-up in the 1997 election, given by the formula (W-R)/(W+R), where
W = percentage of votes for the winning candidate, R = percentage of
votes for the runner up.
• Dist_N = absolute distance between the winning candidate and the
runner-up in the 1997 election, divided by 1000.
• BBC100 = dummy variable equal to 1 if the constituency has been in-
cluded by the BBC among the “100 contested constituencies”.
• Density = population density expressed as the number of residents per
hectare divided by 1000.
• Electorate = total electorate in the constituency divided by 1000.
• Big shot = dummy variable equal to 1 if one of the candidates in the
constituency has been classified as a ”big-shot”. This means when one of
the candidates is either a current or former minister, or a current member
of the “shadow cabinet”, or the leader of the Liberal-Democratic Party.
• Unemployment% = unemployment rate, expressed as total unemployed
over active population, multiplied by 100.
• Inactive%= percentage of inactive population. This is the total of re-
tired, students, permanently sick and other inactive over total residents
multiplied by 100.
• Age = average age.
• HighD = percentage of residents with high qualifications, defined as the
number of residents with degree or higher title over the total residents,
multiplied by 100;
• GLondon = dummy variable equal to 1 for the greater London constituen-
cies.
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5.0.2 Individual level
• QP = dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is a regular reader of
The Times, The Guardian, The Independent, The Financial Times, The
Daily Telegraph, or any local newspaper.
• Education : respondent’s education level. Categorical variable from 1 to
7.
• Income: total household income from all sources before tax. Categorical
variable from 1 to 16.
• Age : respondent’s age (>18).
• Sex: 1=male
• Married: 1=yes (=1 also if “living as married”)
• Asian: =1 if Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Chinese, Other Asian.
• Black: =1 if Black African, Black Caribbean, Other Black
• Churchgoer: “Apart from such special occasions as weddings, funerals
and baptisms and so on, how often do you attend services or meeting
connected with your religion?”. Categorical variable from 1 (never or
practically never) to 8 (once a week or more).
• Lenght of Residence : Answer to the question: “How long have you lived
in this neighbourhood?”.
• Ideology: derived from individual placement on a left (0) to right (10)
scale. Ideology=0 if left-right=5, Ideology=1 if left-right=4 or 6 etc.
• Registered: 1=yes.
• V oted92: =1 if voted in 1992 general election (self reported).
• Economic Activity. Categorical variable:
1. “in paid work for at least 10 hours in week” or “waiting to take up paid
work already accepted”; 1498 obs.;
2. “in full time education (not paid for by the employer, including on vaca-
tion”. 9 obs.;
3. “on government training/employment programme”. 64 obs.;
4. “unemployed”. 127 obs.;
5. “permanently sick or disabled”. 131 obs.;
6. “wholly retired from work”. 642 obs.;
7. “looking after the home”. 324 obs.;
8. “other”. 18 obs.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
News 641 3.8658 18.4735 0 (app. to 0.01) 388
Log(News) 641 -1.3847 2.8319 -4.6052 5.961
Dist_P 641 0.2972 0.2006 0.0012 0.8219
Dist_N 641 10859 6906 53 33759
BBC100 641 0.156 0.3631 0 1
Density 641 1.6524 1.9092 0.0088 11.6298
Electorate/1000 641 66.5437 8.0574 22.983 101.68
Turnout% 641 71.3165 5.6359 51.4 82.2
BS 641 0.078 0.2684 0 1
Age 641 37.8866 1.881 32.8793 46.533
Inactive% 641 51.32 3.2413 38.858 61.0908
Unemployment% 641 9.45 3.8 2.868 22.4896
HighD% 641 7.0963 3.743 1.4891 25.084
GLondon 641 0.1154 0.3198 0 1
QP 2807 0.1778 0.3824 0 1
Education 2807 3.6021 2.1637 1 7
Income 2807 7.0495 4.587 1 16
Age 2807 48.3035 17.517 18 94
Sex 2807 0.4653 0.4989 0 1
Married 2807 0.5885 0.4922 0 1
Asian 2807 0.0185 0.1349 0 1
Black 2807 0.0089 0.094 0 1
Churchgoer 2807 1.9882 2.6079 0 7
Length of Residence 2807 19.5248 17.9378 0 94
Ideology 2807 1.9291 1.7758 0 6
Registered 2807 0.9865 0.1156 0 1
Voted92 2807 0.7973 0.4021 0 1
Table 2: The variable "News"
News Frequency Percent Cumulate
0 265 41.34 41,34
1 165 25.74 67.08
2 74 11.54 78.63
3 28 4.37 83
4 18 2.81 85.80
5 24 3.74 89.55
6-10 25 3.9 93.45
11-20 19 2.96 96.41
21-30 10 1.56 97.97
31-40 3 047 98.44
41-50 3 047 98.91
51-100 4 0.62 99.53
>100 3 0.47 100
Table 3: Information Supply (OLS)
Dependent Variable = Log(News)
1 2 3 4
Dist_P -1.4808
(-1.960)
Dist_Nx1000 -0.0366
(-1.924)
BBC100 1.1889 1.0415
(4.306) (3.84)
Density 0.2448 0.2521 0.2081 0.2535
(2.076) (2.153) (1.783) (2.227)
Electorate/1000 0.0321 0.3891 0.0334 0.336
(2.311) (2.884) (2.463) (2.46)
Turnout -0.04 -0.0305 -0.0472
(-1.406) (-1.138) (-1.801)
Big shot 3.4017 3.3891 3.4925 3.4918
(8.815) (8.726) (8.955) (8.899)
Age -0.1074 -0.1071 -0.0701 -0.07
(-1.268) (-1.264) (-0.83) (-0.836)
Inactive 0.1449 0.1423 0.1257 0.1209
(2.022) (1.989) (1.753) (1.704)
Unemployment -0.1789 -0.179 -0.1985 -0.1625
(-2.544) (-2.555) (-2.847) (-2.414)
HighD 0.0327 0.0284 0.039 0.0322
(0.857) (0.742) (1.036) (0.862)
GLondon 0.7046 0.7094 0.8574 0.8016
(1.589) (1.605) (1.971) (1.855)
Constant -2.8828 -3.919 -3.3395 -6.8138
(-0.764) (-1.082) (-0.948) (-2.368)
Obs 641 641 641 641
R-squared 0.1662 0.166 0.1818 0.1779
Note: robust standard errors. T-statistics in parenthesis
Table 4: Information Demand
(Probit marginal effects)
Dependent Variable = QP
1 2 3
Education 0.0368 0.0368 0.0367
(10.20) (10.03) (9.99)
Income 0.0178 0.0184 0.0185
(9.12) (9.30) (9.31)
Age 0.0041 0.0045 0.0045
(1.67) (1.80) (1.80)
Age2 0.0002 -0.00002 -0.00004
(0.07) (0.01) (0.02)
Sex 0.0584 0.0605 0.0604
(4.14) (4.23) (4.22)
Married -0.0037 -0.0045 -0.0045
(0.24) (0.29) (0.30)
Asian 0.0669 0.0545 0.0538
(1.12) (0.93) (0.92)
Black 0.1124 0.0734 0.0717
(1.36) (0.95) (0.93)
Churchgoer 0.0107 0.0114 0.0115
(4.36) (4.60) (4.62)
Length of Residence -0.0009 -0.0011 -0.0011
(2.20) (2.46) (2.47)
Registered -0.0969 -0.3821 -0.3955
(1.45) (1.50) (1.55)
Voted92 -0.0104 -0.0112 -0.0111
(0.58) (0.61) (0.60)
Ideology 0.0199 0.0196 0.0196
(5.41) (5.28) (5.28)
GLondon 0.0404 0.0450 0.0437
(1.64) (1.78) (1.74)
Electorate/1000 -0.0029 -0.0021 -0.002
(3.98) (2.92) (2.85)
Dist_P -0.1785
(4.87)
BBC100 0.0474 0.0453
(2.24) (2.14)
Big shot -0.0225
(0.85)
Economic Activity yes yes yes
Obs. 2807 2807 2807
Log-Likelihood -1053.1073 -1061.8214 -1061.4073
Pseudo-R2 0.1983 0.1917 0.192
Note: robust standard errors. T-statistics in parenthesis
